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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal presents a question involving the right of the Appellant Dennis Sallaz to an

award of attorney fees under I. C. § 12-120(3). In the underlying action the district court determined
that attorney Dennis Sallaz ("Sallaz") had no personal liability on the malpractice claim that had
been brought against him by the Plaintiff Pamela K. Joerger Stephen ("Stephen") on the basis that
there was no attorney-client relationship between Sallaz and Stephen. The district court then denied
Sallaz's request for an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) on the basis that the dispute
between Sallaz and Stephen did not involve a commercial transaction.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Respondent Pamela K. Joerger Stephen filed a malpractice complaint against her

attorney Scott G. Gatewood ("Gatewood"), and the law firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., on
August 4, 2006. Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd, et al., 4th Dist. Ada Co. Case No. CV OC
0614241. (R., pg. 3). Gatewood had represented Stephen in her divorce action that had been
commenced in2003. Stephen v. Stephen, 4th Dist. Ada Co. Case No. CV DR 03-0115ID.
Almost one year after the malpractice action had been commenced the parties entered into
a stipulation for the joinder of Dennis Sallaz as a defendant in that action by the filing an amended
complaint. (R., pg. 5, and Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal).
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Ultimately, the parties agreed to waive a jury trial (Tr., pg. 88, L. 13 to pg. 90, L. 16), and
Stephen's malpractice action went to trial before the district court on August 12, 14, and 18,2008.
(Tr., pp. 98-612). The district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October
3,2008, and issued a Judgment on December 1,2008 awarding Stephen $27,435.00 in damages
against the law firm Sallaz & Gatewood, and Scott Gatewood, individually, but not as against Dennis
Sallaz, individually. (See, Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal).
The district court entered an Amended Judgment on February 9, 2009 (R, pp. 73-75), and on
March 19, 2009 a notice of appeal was filed by Sallaz & Gatewood, and Scott Gatewood, from the
malpractice judgment, and by Dennis Sallaz from the district court's denial of attorney fees to him.

(R., pp. 82-87).
On July 24,2009 that part of this appeal which had arisen from the December 1,2008 final
judgment on the legal malpractice claim was dismissed on the basis that the appeal, as filed on
March 19, 2009, was untimely from the date of that judgment. The Appellant Sallaz's appeal from
the district court's February 9, 2009 denial of his request for attorney fees was deemed timely, as
based upon the March 19, 2009 notice of appeal.
Although the Appellant Sallaz had also argued before the district court for an award of
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and for an award of sanctions under Rule 11, I.R.C.P. (R., pp. 6770), on this appeal he only argues for reversal of the district court's decision to deny him an award
of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 16,2003 Pamela K. Joerger Stephen engaged the services of attorney Scott

G. Gatewood to represent her in a divorce action and signed a fee agreement with Mr. Gatewood.

(See, "Fee Agreement," as attached to Appellant's Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal).
Gatewood was then - as he is now - a member of the law firm, Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd.
Stephen testified at trial that she never had any dealings in her divorce action with another
member of the firm, Dennis 1. Sallaz, the appellant that is before this Court, and that in fact she had
"never metthe man before." (Tr., pg. 431, L. 10 to pg. 432, L. I). Other than an unsigned letter that
was sent to Idaho Department of Motor Vehicles under Sallaz's name, (see, "Lien Letter," as
attached to Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal), which requested the
placement of a lien on a vehicle owned by Stephen to secure the payment of her legal fees to
Gatewood, there was no evidence presented at trial that established that Sallaz had provided any
legal services to Stephen in the course of an attorney-client relationship in her divorce action.
On page 3 of the district court's October 3, 2008 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment, the district judge declared that, "There was no evidence presented to the Court that Dennis
Sallaz provided any legal services directly or indirectly to the Plaintiff nor did he act in a supervisory
capacity over Gatewood." (See, October 3, 2008 Findings of Fact, as attached to Appellant's

12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal).
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Subsequently, the district denied the Appellant Sallaz' s request for an award of attorney fees
under I.C. § 12-120(3) by declaring the following:
Mr. Sallaz, in his individual capacity did not have a contractual relationship with the
Plaintiff, and the claim was not based on a commercial transaction or a personal
injury. See I.e. § 12-120. Therefore, Mr. Sallaz is not entitled to fees under section
12-120.
(R., pg. 67).

On this appeal the Appellant Sallaz challenges the district court's denial of an award of
attorney fees to him under I.C. § 12-120(3).

D.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The award of attorney fees to a prevailing party under I.C. § 12-120(3) is mandatory. Action

Collection Services, Inc. v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 290,192 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Ct.App.2008). The

issue of whether the district court erred in denying an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3)
presents a question of law that is subject to free review by the appellate court. Rahas v. Ver Melt,
141 Idaho 412, 414,111 P.3d 97,99 (2005).

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the district court erred in denying the Appellant Sallaz an award of attorney
fees under I.C. § 12-120(3)7

2.

Whether the Appellant Sallaz is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
IAR. 41 and I.C. § 12-120(3)7
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III.
ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred In Denying the Appellant Sallaz An Award Of Attorney Fees
Under I.e. § 12-120(3)
When the district court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 3,

2008 (Attached to Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal), it held that the
Plaintiff/Respondent Stephen did not have an attomey-client relationship with the Defendant!
Appellant Dennis Sallaz, and therefore no relief would be granted to Stephen, as against Sallaz
individually. The district court held as follows:
There was no evidence presented to the Court that Dennis Sallaz provided any
legal services directly or indirectly to the Plaintiff nor did he act in a supervisory
capacity over Gatewood. Sallaz and Gatewood formed a professional service
corporation in September of2003, known as SALLAZ& GATEWOOD, CHTD, and
continue to the present date in that business organization.
Findings of Fact at pg. 3. The last two lines of the "Judgment," which was included in the Court's
October 3, 2008 Findings of Fact, included the following statement:
The judgment will reflect Scott Gatewood and Sallaz and Gatewood Chartered as the
Defendants that are responsible for this judgment. Dennis Sallaz in his individual
capacity will not be listed as a defendant for purposes of the damages award.
Findings of Fact at pg. 14 (emphasis added).
In its February 9,2009 attorney fee decision, the district court made the following additional
finding in respect to Mr. Sallaz's lack ofliability in the malpractice action:
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The Court further found that Defendant Dennis Sallaz as an individual was
not personally liable to the Plaintiff because Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered as a
professional corporation shielded Mr. Sallaz from personal liability . There was no
evidence presented to the Court that Mr. Sallaz provided legal services directly to the
plaintiff or that he acted in a supervisory capacity over Mr. Gatewood.
R., pg. 62.
As a result of these findings by the district court, Sallaz obtained all the relief that it was
possible for him obtain in order to prevail as a defendant in the malpractice action. See, Straub v.
Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69-70 n. 2, 175 P.3d 754, 758-59 n. 2 (2007); and Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719,117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005) (,,[A]voiding liability is

as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff' ... "courts must not ignore
the value of a successful defense." ... "Reed defended himself through the entire trial and escaped
all liability - again, achieving the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved.").
Thereafter, Sallaz moved for an award of attorney fees and costs. (R., pp. 14-15). His
memorandum of costs and fees has been included as an exhibit to the record on appeal. (R., pg. 92).
As summarized by the district court, "Mr. Sallaz claims $34,004.12 in attorney fees and costs of
$1,237 and $2,500 for consultation and records review by Dr. Dave Sanford, Ph.D. and Christopher
Partridge, MD respectively. Both of these motions are based on the argument that Mr. Sallaz was
frivolously named as a Defendant in this law suit." (R., pg. 66).
In denying the Appellant Dennis Sallaz an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) the
district court in its February 9, 2009 decision declared as follows:
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This case does not fall within section 12-120 because the amount pled was not
$25,000 or less, Mr. Sallaz, in his individual capacity did not have a contractual
relationship with the Plaintiff, and the claim was not based on a commercial
transaction or a personal injury. See I.e. § 12-120. Therefore, Mr. Sallaz is not
entitled to fees under section 12-120.
(R., pp. 66-67, emphasis added).

It appears that the district court erred in its declaration that Sallaz was not entitled to an
award of attorney fees only because, "Mr. Sallaz, in his individual capacity did not have a contractual
relationship with the Plaintiff, ... " See e.g., Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 752, 864 P.2d 194,
198 (Ct.App.1993) ("It is well-settled in Idaho that one who successfully defends against the
enforcement of a contract, when the gravamen of the transaction is a commercial transaction,
nevertheless may be entitled to attorney fees even though the court has ruled that no contract exists
or it is unenforceable." (citations omitted». See also, Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 436, 64 P.3d
959, 965 (Ct.App.2002) ("[Flees must be awarded to the prevailing party even though, as here,
liability under the contract was not established.").

It also has been a long-standing rule of Idaho law that although the attorney-client
relationship is founded in contract, and is a commercial transaction, that a malpractice claim is a tort
action. Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 416, 16 P.2d 661, 662 (1932). Therefore, the more
significant - but uncited - reason supporting the district court's decision was the long-standing
precedent arising out of Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991), and related cases, 1

See e.g., Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 350, 33 P.3d 816, 824 (2001)
(health care malpractice); Rice v. LUster, 132 Idaho 897, 901, 980 P.2d 561, 565 (1999) (attorney
1
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under which Idaho courts had applied the rationale that because an attorney malpractice case
essentially sounded in tort, there could be no award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). The
Court in Fuller had declared:
We were not asked in Griggs [116 Idaho 228,775 P.2d 120 (1989)] to decide whether
a malpractice action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters
ofI.C. § 12-120(3). We now hold that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action,
and even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a
"commercial transaction," attorney fees under 12-120(3) are not authorized ....
119 Idaho at 425,807 P.2d at 643 (bracketed reference added). By reference to the Fuller decision
the Court in Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72,79,910 P.2d 744,751 (1996) reiterated
the fundamental principle that, "underlying the claim in Fuller v. Wolters was a commercial
transaction -

a contract for services between an attorney and a client."

In a 2007 decision, Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007),
the Court addressed the question of whether Mike Blimka, as the prevailing party on appeal, was
entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) in an action that he had brought against
My Web Wholesaler that was based upon the intentional tort of fraud, and which had arisen out of
a contract between the parties for the wholesale purchase of 26,500 pairs of jeans. In awarding
attorney fees to Blimka on appeal the Court overturned those prior Idaho precedents that had denied
such an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) when tort relief was requested, even though

malpractice); Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 702, 707, 838 P.2d 305, 310 (1991) (attorney
malpractice); and Smith v. DavidS. ShurtleffandAssociates, 124 Idaho 239,242-43,858 P.2d 778,
781-82 (Ct.App.l993) (architect malpractice).
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a case otherwise involved a commercial transaction. The Court in Blimka accomplished this result
in the following succinctly stated holding:
From time to time the Court has denied fees under I. C. § 12-120(3) on the
commercial transaction ground either because the claim sounded in tort or because
no contract was involved. The commercial transaction ground in I.C. § 12-120(3)
neither prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious
conduct (see Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat 'I Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 369, 109 P.3d 11 04,
1111 (2005», nor does it require that there be a contract. Any previous holdings to
the contrary are overruled. We hold that Blimka is entitled to a fee award on appeal
with respect to his fraud claim, as he is seeking recovery of damages sustained as a
result of the commercial transaction involved in this case.
143 Idaho at 728-29, 152 P.3d at 599-600.
Although the Court in Blimka had broadly overruled "Any previous holdings to the contrary
... ," the exact boundaries of that decision remained unclear. See e.g., Evett, Attorney Fees Under
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) Post Blimka v. My Web Wholesale, LLC, The Advocate, MarchiApril 2008

at pp. 14-15 (Idaho State Bar). Almost two years after the Blimka decision was issued, the Court in
City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009) upheld the district court's decision,

made in reliance upon the Blimkaprecedent, to grant an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party
in that attorney malpractice case. In addition to relying upon the Blimka precedent, the Court in
Buxton also expressly overruled the Fuller decision's previously controlling rationale for denying

an award of attorney fees under I. C. § 12-120(3) on the basis that a legal malpractice action is a tort.
The Court in Buxton observed that the first part of I.C. § 12-120(3) only addresses those
actions that are brought "to recover on" the specifically listed contract actions. 146 Idaho at 665, 201
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P.3d at 638. But then the Court further observed that the latter part of that statute, which broadly
encompasses, "any commercial transaction," is not so restricted. Id.

As a result, there is no

statutorily-based prohibition to an award of attorney fees arising out of a commercial transaction
under I.e. §12-120(3) even though a claim for recovery is stated in tort. Id. Consequently, even
though a legal malpractice action is not an action to recover upon a contract, but instead is a tort,
because that action does arise out of a commercial transaction - a contract for services between an
attorney and a client - Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides a statutorily-stated basis for an award of
attorney fees to a prevailing party in a legal malpractice action. The Court in Buxton concluded that,
"The district court correctly held that following our decision in Blimka, Fuller v. Wolters is
overruled." 146 Idaho at 665, 201 P.3d at 638.

In this case the only dispute that was adjudicated between the Plaintiff Stephen and the
Defendant Sallaz was whether or not she had entered into a contractual attorney-client relationship
with him. Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,272,923 P.2d 976,979 (1996) (stating the elements
necessary to state a claim for attorney malpractice as including, "the creation of an attorney-client
relationship").

Sallaz prevailed on his claim that he had not entered into an attorney-client

relationship with Stephen upon which she could base a malpractice action against him. (See, October
3,2008 Findings of Fact at pg. 3; February 9, 2009 Memorandum Decision at pg. 2, R., pg. 62).
Under long-standing Idaho precedent, the basis of an attorney-client relationship is
contractual, and therefore a commercial transaction. Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796,800-01,606
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P.2d 90,94-95 (1980); Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 79, 910 P.2d 744, 751 (1996)
("[U]nderlying the claim in Fuller v. Wolters was a commercial transaction - a contract for services
between an attorney and a client."). See also, Restatement (Third) The Law Governing Lawyers, §
18 Client-Lawyer Contracts (American Law Institute, 2000) (setting forth the general rules
governing lawyer-client contracts).
A straightforward application of both the 2007 Blimka decision and the 2009 Buxton
decision requires a mandatory award of attorney fees to Sallaz as a prevailing party in the action
below. Consequently, this Court should find that the district court erred as a matter of law in
denying an award of attorney fees to the Appellant Sallaz under I.C. § 12-120(3). In reliance upon
the precedents established in Blimka and Buxton, this Court should reverse the district court's
decision denying Sallaz an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), and remand this case to
the district court for a determination of the reasonable amount of attorney fees that should be
awarded to Sallaz under that statute.
B.

If the Appellant Sallaz Prevails On This Appeal, Then He Is Entitled To An Award Of
Costs and Attorney Fees Under Rules 40 & 41, I.A.R.. And I.C. § 12-120(3)

It is well established that I.C. § 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party on appeal as well as in the trial court. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430,438,64
P.3d 959, 967 (Ct.App.2002). Ifthe Appellant Sallaz is deternlined to be the prevailing party on this
appeal, then under the authority ofLA.R. 41 and I.C. § 12-120(3) he requests an award of attorney
fees on appeal, and an award of his costs on appeal under I.A.R. 40.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in denying an award of attorney fees to the Appellant Dennis Sallaz
under I.e. § 12-120(3). This Court should reverse and remand this case to the district court with
instructions to enter a judgment granting an award of attorney fees to Sallaz and to determine the
reasonable amount of attorney fees to which he is entitled.
In addition this Court should also make an award of attorney fees on appeal to the Appellant
Sallaz under I.C. § 12-120(3) and likewise issue a directive to the district court to determine the
reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Sallaz in bringing this appeal.

Respectfully Submitted this 7th day of January 2010 ..

. Q .glb..A-.-''
Attorney or the Appellant
Dennis Sallaz
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